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Over the recent decade, trade has increasingly shifted towards online markets. Com-
monly in these markets, consumers do not observe all product characteristics at the
time of purchase. For instance, if a consumer buys clothes he may only have a vague
idea of the cut and the color. If he books a hotel online, he may learn some coarse
information from the hotel’s number of stars or the reviews of other customers, but
many consumer-specific details will remain unclear until his actual arrival. Conse-
quently, despite having some ex-ante information, the buyer will learn whether the
good matches his private taste sufficiently only ex post, ie., after he contracts with
the seller and gets access to the good.
A monopolist may exploit this partial uninformedness of the consumer, and
offer contracts which leave only small information rents to consumers. This paper
addresses the question to what extent regulation that obliges the monopolist to
provide consumer-information, can protect consumers against an exploitation of the
monopolist’s market power. In particular, I derive the buyer-optimal information
design in such markets.
On the simple intuition that more information cannot hurt the buyer, one might
expect that consumer surplus can only be increasing in the amount of buyers’ ex-
ante private information. This is, however, not the case. Since sellers respond
in their contract offers to the structure of buyers’ private information, the choice
of information exhibits a strategic effect on the subsequent contracting game. I
show that the buyer-optimal ex-ante information keeps the buyer to some extent
uninformed about his valuation. The buyer-optimal information signal induces
efficient trade and distributes all rents in excess of the classical static monopoly
profit with fully informed buyers, to the buyer. Moreover, a seller-optimal contract
for the buyer-optimal information always consists of a simple buy-now offer without
refund. In a second step, I characterize all divisions of buyer surplus and seller
surplus that can arise under different information signals for a given prior.
While a buyer may have incomplete information about his value for a product
at the time of contracting, I assume that he learns his exact valuation ex post by
inspecting the product after delivery.1 Due to the sequential information structure,
1Alternatively, assume that inspection only reveals some additional information, and interpret
2
the seller faces a sequential screening problem. She optimally screens buyers by
offering several contracts, which differ in price and refund conditions, as studied in
Courty and Li (2000).2 I extend their sequential screening framework, by allowing
the buyer to decide how much he wants to learn about his valuation for the good
before contracting. More specifically, the buyer, or the regulator on behalf of the
buyer, first chooses a signal about the valuation for the good. The seller observes
the signal distribution, but not its realization. This assumption expresses that
the seller can observe what the buyer learns, but not how it translates into the
buyer’s valuation.3 Then, the seller offers a contract, before the buyer learns his
true valuation.
The seller screens the buyer with respect to his signal realization. She optimally
offers a menu of option contracts, each specifying a price, and the refund conditions.
Intuitively, buyers with higher valuation uncertainty are more attracted by contracts
with high refund flexibility.4
To better understand why a partial information revelation can be beneficial to
the buyer, assume that trade is efficient for all buyer types, and consider the full
information benchmark:
If the buyer learns his exact valuation by choosing a fully informative signal,
there is no further learning. The seller charges the static monopoly price, leaving
an information rent to the buyer. The rent, however, may come at the cost of trade
inefficiencies, since the monopoly price in general induces only high types to buy.
This benchmark naturally lead to the question, whether there is an only par-
tially informative signal that induces efficient trade, and distributes the additional
rents of this more efficient allocation to the buyer. Indeed, I show that for any
prior distribution there is a suitable signal structure, such that the seller chooses a
contract for which
buyer’s valuation as his updated value estimate. As buyers are risk neutral, this leaves all insights
of the paper unchanged.
2The optimality of sequential screening also features, among others, in Baron and Besanko
(1984), Battaglini (2005), Eső and Szentes (2007), Hoffmann and Inderst (2011), Krähmer and
Strausz (2011), Nocke et al. (2011), and Pavan et al. (2014).
3I am only interested in product information that relates to subjective taste. By the unraveling
argument of Viscusi (1978), every seller will disclose any information on quality, if he can credibly
and costlessly do so.
4Due to the buyer’s freedom to design information signals, the regularity conditions, imposed
in Courty and Li (2000), may be violated. Thus, we cannot rely on their analysis to find the
optimal contract.
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1. trade is efficient, and
2. the seller only receives the static monopoly profit of fully informed buyers.
Note that this static monopoly profit is always a lower bound on the seller’s profit,
since she can always charge the static monopoly price and allow full refund, after
the buyer learns his type. Hence, such a signal is buyer optimal in the sense that it
maximizes the buyer surplus.
The optimal signal keeps low types partly uninformed, while high types have full
information. Indeed, if different low types obtain the same signal, the seller can sell
to these types by providing less information rent, since they have to break even only
on average, rather than individually. Consequently, the seller has an incentive to
lower the price below the static monopoly price, in order to increase participation.
Lower prices increase efficiency as well as rents for high types.
Moreover, I fully characterize the possible combinations of buyer surplus and
seller surplus that can arise in the sequential screening model for different signal
distributions. Similar to Bergemann et al. (2015), I show that the only limits are
imposed by the natural constraints that
1. buyer utility is nonnegative,
2. the seller receives at least the static monopoly profit, and
3. aggregate surplus does not exceed the first-best gains from trade.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: After discussing the relevant
literature, I introduce the model in Section 3. Section 4 covers the case of a uniform
distribution and provides an illustrative example. In Section 5, I construct the
buyer-optimal signal. Section 6 characterizes all possible surplus division, before
Section 7 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
My paper contributes to the growing literature on dynamic mechanism design, in
which private information is learned over time. Baron and Besanko (1984) were
the first to study dynamic price discrimination in a two-period procurement model
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with auditing. My model builds on the framework of Courty and Li (2000) who an-
alyze optimal price discrimination for monopolistic markets in a two-period model.
Battaglini (2005) and Pavan et al. (2014) provide general models on optimal dy-
namic mechanism design for longer time horizons.
A recent branch of the literature, building on the pioneer work of Lewis and
Sappington (1994), studies sellers’ strategic information revelation. Bergemann
and Pesendorfer (2007) analyze auctions, where the seller can choose the accuracy
by which the buyers learn their private valuations. They identify a trade-off be-
tween allocation efficiency and information rents. Eső and Szentes (2007) show that
the trade-off disappears when the information provision is part of the contractual
relationship, and argue that the seller should always disclose all relevant informa-
tion. Li and Shi (2016) show that this no longer holds when the seller can use
discriminatory information disclosure. If buyers have different ex ante types, and
the provided information can depend to the reported types then partial information
disclosure may be optimal. Hoffmann and Inderst (2011) characterize optimal con-
tracts for the case where the buyer’s and the seller’s information are stochastically
independent.
My paper conversely analyzes buyers’ optimal information acquisition. The
agent may acquire private information costlessly and observably before the contrac-
tual relationship, to obtain a strategic advantage in the contracting game. This
timing is in contrast to the classical literature on buyer’s information acquisition
in principal-agent relationships, where the principle aims to contractually provide
incentives for costly learning.5
The model is probably closest related to Roesler and Szentes (2017), who char-
acterize the buyer-optimal signal in a classical static one-unit trade environment.
In contrast to their setup, I assume that after delivery the buyer receives additional
information that affects his valuation. As a result, the seller may combine the con-
tract with refund options, which—different to Roesler and Szentes—induces a lower
bound on seller profit, and results in efficient trade for the buyer optimal signal.
I consider my framework to be more appropriate in the context such as internet
markets, where consumer typically receive additional information upon the good’s
5E.g., Lewis and Sappington (1997), Crémer et al. (1998), Szalay (2009), Krähmer and Strausz
(2011).
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delivery (see Krähmer and Strausz (2011)), while the context of Roesler and Szentes
seems more appropriate in markets in which this learning effect is negligable.
Kessler (1998) analyzes the value of ignorance in a classical adverse selection
model with two types. She finds that, even if the agent can learn his type costlessly,
he will choose a signal that is uninformative with some positive probability, in order
to receive a more favorable contract.
Bergemann et al. (2015) analyze trading contracts, where the seller has infor-
mation beyond the prior distribution. In particular, they characterize the buyer-
optimal seller information structure. In contrast to my model the seller receives
a signal, while the buyer is fully informed. In my model, the seller has to elicit
information on the signal via an incentive compatible mechanism.
The idea that one party can choose arbitrary information signals to influence
another party’s decision has lately drawn a lot of attention, and produced a vast
literature on Bayesian persuasion, based on the work of Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011). My setup is different from persuasion, since the buyer himself is uninformed.
We can, however, make use of the tools from the framework of arbitrary signal
choices. (One interpretation of my model is that the buyer tries to “persuade”
himself, in the sense that he wants to manipulate his beliefs to obtain a strategic
advantage towards the seller.)
3 The model
A seller can produce one unit of a good at zero cost. The valuation of the good
for a buyer is drawn from a commonly known prior distribution F (θ) on some
positive support [θ, θ] with positive, continuous density f(θ).6 Before contracting
and learning the valuation, the buyer (or the regulator in the buyer’s interest) can
choose a signal structure to gain some information on the valuation. The signal
distribution is commonly observed, the realization is private information to the
buyer. I allow for any general signal structure in form of a Borel-measurable signal
space T ⊆ R, together with a probability measure µ on the Borel σ-algebra of
6The restriction to a positive support is only to keep the exposition transparent and tractable.
It does not change the results. Indeed, if trade is inefficient for some buyer types, one can interpret
an optimal learning process as a two step procedure. First the buyer learns whether θ > 0, and
then applies the optimal learning process described in this paper to the conditional distribution
on θ being larger than 0.
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✶dµ = F (θ)
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ].7
The setup includes the common examples of a finite signal space T = {τ1, ..., τn}
with pi = Prob(τi), and the restriction that
n∑
i=1
F (θ|τi)pi = F (θ),




F (θ|τ)dG(τ) = F (θ).
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. the buyer publicly chooses a signal structure
2. the signal realization is privately observed by the buyer
3. the seller offers a contract, the buyer accepts / rejects
4. the buyer observes his type
5. transfers are made according to the rules of the contract
For any signal structure that reveals at least some information to the buyer, the
seller in Stage 3 faces a classical sequential screening problem, as described in Courty
and Li (2000). They show that any optimal deterministic contract can be imple-
mented as a menu of option contracts from which the buyer can choose at the
contracting stage. An option contract specifies an upfront payment a to the seller,
and an option price p, for which the buyer can decide to buy, after he learns his
7We explicitly do not make common restrictions on the signal distribution, such as non-shifting
support or an order by first-order stochastic dominance.
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true valuation.8
In the following section, I derive the buyer-optimal signal, which achieves the
upper bound of buyer utility, for a uniform prior. In Section 5, I show how the
construction generalizes to arbitrary prior distributions if we restrict the seller to
the use of option contracts.
4 The Uniform Case
It is instructive to analyze first the case of a uniform prior, as it catches the main
intuitions.
Let the prior F (θ) be the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Consider, as a bench-
mark, that the buyer fully learns his type θ under signal τ . The seller will then
charge the monopoly price of
pM = argmax
p
p(1− F (p)) = 1/2.
She will therefore sell to the buyer if and only if the buyer’s valuation exceeds 1/2.
The seller’s profit is πM = 1/4, while the buyer’s expected surplus is 1/8.
Note that the seller can always ignore the possibility to exploit the signal for
ex-ante screening, and just charge the monopoly price after the buyer learns the
true valuation, i.e. (a, p) = (0, pm). Hence, the static monopoly profit of πM = 1/4
defines a lower bound for the seller’s utility.
Since trade is always efficient, the upper bound for buyer surplus is achieved, if
trade always occurs, and the seller is left with her monopoly profit πM . The main





0 θ ≤ 12
θ θ > 12 .
(1)
The buyer only learns his valuation if it is above 1/2. Buyers with valuation below
1/2 are pooled in one signal of τ = 0, which induces an expected valuation of
E[θ|τ = 0] = 1/4.
8Equivalently, one can interpret such a contract as a buy price of a+p, together with the option
to return the good for a refund of p.
8
Suppose the seller offers a single contract (a, p) = (1/4, 0), which means she
offers the good at a price of 1/4 before the buyer learns θ with certainty. Since
E[θ|τ ] ≥ 1/4 for all τ , this offer will attract all buyers. Using the tools of mechanism
design, I show in the appendix that, given this signal structure, there is no contract
that generates a higher seller utility.
Proposition 1. Given signal τ , there is no mechanism which generates a seller
utility above 14 . In particular, the contract (
1
4 , 0), which sells to all buyers ex ante
at a price of 14 , is a seller-optimal trading mechanism.
Since the seller is left with her lower bound utility of 1/4, and social surplus is
maximized, the signal τ implements the upper bound of buyer utility. It is therefore
a buyer-optimal signal.
Even though the above construction of the optimal signal is specific to the
uniform distribution, the main intuitions from this example carry over to the general
case. It is suboptimal for the buyer to be fully informed about his valuation. If
buyers with relatively low valuations remain partly uninformed, then the seller has
to provide less information rent to sell to these types. To include lower types in
trade, the seller must set low prices for all buyers. While low types’ individual
rationality constraints bind, and they make zero profits on average, high types
benefit from lower prices and buyer surplus increases. Since more types trade,
efficiency increases as well.
Applications and Discussion
There are numerous ways in which a regulator or intermediary can control the
amount of product information exposed to consumers prior to trade.
One natural application for the use of information design are internet platforms.
Especially in the hospitality and travelling industry it is common to offer car rentals,
holiday packages, hotel stays, or airline tickets on internet platforms, such as online
travel agencies.9 By collecting personalized data, platforms can gather a profound
understanding of consumers preferences. Further, they are able to discriminate
product information with respect to individual consumers.
9According to Green and Lomanno (2012), in 2010 about 11 percent of all revenues in the US
hotel industry were generated by online travel agencies like Expedia, Priceline, and Orbitz.
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If the platform has to grant standard monopoly profits to hotels, but aims
to maximize consumer surplus due to platform competition, it faces exactly the
information design problem described in the model. As seen in Proposition 1 and
generalized in Theorem 1, the platform optimally does not provide all product
details to consumers, but leaves details of the deal somewhat opaque, and sells
at low prices. Indeed, such “opaque deals”, are common practice in online travel
agencies such as priceline and hotwire: The platforms offer discounted deals, which
guarantee specific features such as the number of hotel stars or location at the city
center, but reveal the identity and other details of the hotel only after payment.10
Note that in contrast to Shapiro and Shi (2008) and Balestrieri et al. (2015),
where opaque selling is a result of firm’s profit maximizing behavior, in my model it
appears as the natural tool to maximize consumer surplus, which provides a novel
perspective for the use of opaque goods.11
Alternatively, a regulator may control the amount of product information by spe-
cific labelling requirements, certification standards, or—as Hoffmann et al. (2017)
argue— by regulating the length of trial periods.
For instance, both the USA and the EU require sellers to label food ingredients
on the package in descending order of predominance by weight, yet not by the exact
amount.12 The same EU regulation requires firms to label the nutrition value with a
Guideline Daily Amount (GDA), however Grunert et al. (2010) find that only about
70 percent of customers have a conceptional understanding of its meaning. They
find that the understanding is positively correlated with the interest in healthy
eating, which suggests that the information design is particularly informative to
consumers who have a high value for healthy food.
A different information design approach is taken by the Food Standard Agency
(FSA) in the UK. In 2006 they introduced the traffic light rating system, un-
der which nutrition values—such as sugar or saturated fat—are highlighted in red
(high), amber (medium) or green (low). In their literature review on food labelling
Hawley et al. (2013) conclude that traffic light ratings have “most consistently
10Green and Lomanno (2012) find that about one quarter of all hotel bookings in online travel
agencies involve opaque goods.
11In Shapiro and Shi (2008), opaque selling arises as an equilibrium under competition with
differentiated consumers, whereas Balestrieri et al. (2015) show that a monopolist’s optimal selling
strategy for substitutes may feature opaque options.
12USA: 21CFR §101.4, EU: Regulation 1169/2011
10
helped consumers to identify healthier products”.
The following example depicts how certification regulation may provide indi-
vidual consumers with the information signal that generates the consumer-optimal
information structure.
Example: Hotel Certifications
This stylized example aims to illustrate that, in the terms of this paper, the cur-
rent european system of hotel certification can be understood as providing con-
sumers with only partial information. The example, however, also serves to show
that, based on this paper’s arguments, the information provision underlying the
certification—designed by the hotel associations—is not consumer optimal. The
consumer-optimal information regulation is derived.
In 2009 hotel associations from seven European countries founded the “Hotel-
stars Union” to harmonize the national standards of hotel certifications. By 2017
the system was adapted by 17 countries within the European Union, with only very
slight differences between participating countries.
The grading system mainly consists of five different quality levels, represented
by one to five stars13. Participating hotels gather points by providing features from
a list of over 200 possible criteria, divided into categories as reception, services,
gastronomy, and leisure. Hotels who want to certify a certain number of stars must
achieve a respective number of points. Besides some minimum requirements for
each star, hotels are entirely free in how to achieve the number of points.
While the number of stars may be a good measure for the overall hotel quality,
it is quite uninformative about the match value with respect to private taste. While
business travellers may be exceptionally concerned about reception opening hours
and good Wi-Fi, leisure travellers may have a higher valuation for available sports
equipment and wellness services.
For the following example, consider a hotel that has certified a certain number
of stars. Guests who consider to book online can infer from the number of stars
alone only how many total points the hotel achieved in the grading system. The
provided features remain unknown to the guests until they arrive at the hotel and
13Sometimes there are intermediate grades denoted with the label “superior”, in addition to the
number of stars, for details on the national certification gradings see https://www.hotelstars.eu/
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can inspect it.
Potential guests g are—with equal probability—either of type business (g = B),
which only care about features in the categories reception and services, or of type
leisure (g = L), which only care about features in the categories gastronomy and
leisure. Moreover, any type g ∈ {B,L} has private preferences over the specific
features within her relevant categories, which can be represented by a location xg
on the circumference of a circle with perimeter one (Salop’s circle). Assume for each
type g ∈ {B,L} that the location is uniformly distributed on the circumference.
Guests are risk neutral and the realization of (g, xg) is their private information.
The hotel h provides—with equal probability—either mainly features for the
business type (focus h = B), or mainly for the leisure type (focus h = L). The
exact features that the hotel offers for each, business and leisure type, may be
represented by two locations (yB , yL) on the circumferences of two distinct circles,
each with perimeter one. Assume, again, that yB and yL are each ex ante uniformly
distributed on their circumference. Marginal costs for additional guests are zero.
The values of (h, yB , yL) are private information of the hotel, but become observable
after the guest arrives at the hotel.
Let the utility of a guest (g, xg) who pays price p to stay in a hotel (h, yB , yL)
be given by
u((g, xg), (h, yB , yL), p) = 0.5 · ✶g=h + (0.5− d(xg, yg))− p,
where d(xg, yg) ∈ [0, 0.5] describes the distance of xg and yg on the circumference of
the circle. In other words, the guest receives a utility of 0.5 if the hotel has a focus
suitable for his type, and an additional utility up to 0.5 if the hotel offers preferred
features within the relevant categories. As neither the guest nor the hotel have ex
ante any information on the match value, the value is ex ante uniformly distributed
on [0, 1], with values in [0, 0.5] for types g 6= h and values in [0.5, 1] for types g = h.
Since guests’ valuation is ex ante uniform on [0, 1] they have an expected value
of 0.5. The hotel can set p = 0.5 without refund option, and all guests will accept
the offer, leading to an efficient outcome where all rents are realized by the hotel.
Consider now the role of a regulator who is solely interested in consumer surplus
and has the power to precisely regulate the information the hotel has to provide
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online. If the regulator forces the hotel to disclose its focus h ∈ {B,L}, as well as
the available features only in its focal categories—thus the exact position of yh— the
guest receives a signal exactly as defined in (1): Guest types g = h with a valuation
above 0.5 learn their exact valuation as they learn the hotel’s position yg, while guest
types g 6= h don’t learn the relevant position yg and remain pooled with valuations
in [0, 0.5]. As we have seen in Proposition 1, such a signal is guest-optimal, and
implements the upper bound of the guests’ utility.
The intuition of the example is simple: The regulator should exclusively allow
information that is relevant to high types. High types receive high information
rents, while the low types, who are relatively uninformed, induce the seller to set
low prices.
5 The General Case
The main result of the paper is that the buyer can achieve his first-best for any
arbitrary prior distribution:
Theorem 1. Let πM be the standard static monopoly profit the seller can achieve
if the buyer privately learns his valuation before contracting. Then there exists an
information signal such that for the seller’s optimal menu of option contracts
• trade is efficient, and
• the seller receives πM .
Such a signal is buyer-optimal, since it maximizes aggregate surplus and leaves
the seller with her lower bound of utility πM .
The result follows immediately from the more general Theorem 2. I will, how-
ever, provide the intuition how to construct such a signal structure.
If a menu of contracts induces trade for all types θ, then each type will trade at
the lowest available total payment a+ p. This means that any signal which induces
full trade and a seller profit of πM must necessarily sell to all buyers at a uniform
price of a+ p = πM .
We start by defining y as the type such that
E[θ|θ ≤ y] = πM .
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Consider first a signal structure similar that defined in Equation (1) of Section 4,
where types above y learn their valuation, while types θ ≤ y are pooled in one
signal realization. By construction, the pooled buyers are ex ante willing to pay at
most πM for the good. Therefore, a uniform ex ante price of πM would attract all
buyers, and the seller would make monopoly profit πM .
However, for many prior distributions F such a uniform price with full partic-
ipation is suboptimal for the seller, given the signal. The seller may make higher
profit, if she chooses to exclude types below some threshold θ̂ < y from trade. She
could achieve this for example with a menu offer of M = {(a, θ̂)}, where a is chosen
such that types θ ≤ y in the pooling area receive a utility of zero in expectation.
Such a contract comes at the cost of losing the participation of types θ < θ̂, but at
the gain of higher prices and thus more revenue from all types θ > y.
One can modify the signal structure such that such contracts are never opti-
mal. The idea is to give buyers more information by maintaining the property that
E[θ|τ ] = πM for all θ ≤ y. Figure 1 illustrates how to achieve this goal.
Figure 1: Types in intervals with the same color are pooled into the same signal.
Types above y fully learn their valuation, while types below y learn that their
type is in a certain pooling region, represented by the shade of gray, assigned to
their type in Figure 1. The shaded areas are constructed in such a way that for any
shade signal τ
E[θ|τ ] = πM .
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Further, if τ1 is darker than τ0, then F (·|τ1) is a mean preserving spread of F (·|τ0).
Now, we let the area of each shade signal shrink, while we let the number of different
shades goes to infinity. In the limit, we obtain a continuum of shades, where each
signal τ only pools two types {θLτ , θ
H
τ } with θ
L
τ < π
M < θHτ , and E[θ|τ ] = π
M .
If the seller now aims to sell to any type θ̂ < πM , then—by ex ante individual
rationality—she has to offer a contract that charges at most a + p = E[θ|τ(θ) =
τ(θ̃)] = πM . Such a contract would attract all types, and generate a profit of πM
to the seller. It turns out, this is the best the seller can do: suppose that the seller
aims for higher prices at the cost of participation. If it were optimal for the seller
to use a menu for which the lowest type that buys satisfies θ̂ > πM , then one can
show that the best the seller could do is to offer a contract (0, θ̂). Such a contract is
equivalent to an ex post take-it-or-leave-it offer with price θ̂, which certainly cannot
generate more profit to the seller than the optimal static monopoly price with fully
informed buyers.
6 The Limits of Surplus Distribution
In the previous section, I have analyzed a signal which maximizes buyer surplus.
In this section, I characterize which combinations of buyer surplus and seller sur-
plus are feasible in a sequential screening framework. Similarly to Bergemann et al.
(2015), let us first characterize the natural constraints to this problem graphically.
First of all, by buyer’s individual rationality, expected buyer surplus will never
be negative. Second, as argued in the previous section, seller surplus can never fall
below the static monopoly profit, since the seller can always use a static mechanism
after the buyer learned his true type. Finally, aggregate surplus cannot exceed
first-best welfare, which is sketched as the diagonal pareto frontier. Consequently,
any surplus pair must lie in the gray shaded triangle. Point A corresponds to the
buyer-optimal signal, as constructed in Section 5. Point B corresponds to the case,
where the seller has no ex ante information upon the prior distribution. In this
case, the seller can extract the entire surplus by selling ex ante at a price of E[θ].
We will see that any arbitrary point C in the triangle can be implemented as
the solution to the seller’s problem for an appropriate signal distribution.
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Figure 2: All potential pairs of surplus division
Theorem 2. There exists a signal and an optimal sequential selling mechanism
with seller surplus uS and buyer surplus uB if and only if
• uB ≥ 0,
• uS ≥ π
M , and
• uS + uB ≤ E[θ],
where πM is the standard static monopoly profit the seller can achieve, if the buyer
has full information.
A full proof can be found in the appendix. I will sketch the main steps here.
Take an arbitrary surplus pair (BS, SS) which satisfies the above constraints. We
will construct a corresponding signal, such that, indeed, buyer surplus and seller
surplus are given by (uB , uS) = (BS, SS).





f(θ)θdθ = (1− F (x))E[θ|θ ∈ [x, θ]].
Note that the gains from trade uS +uB are indeed given by AS, if we can construct
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a signal for which exactly all types above x trade.
Next, we define the threshold y ≤ θ by
SS = (1− F (x))E[θ|θ ∈ [x, y]].
Further, define a ∈ [x, y] by
a := E[θ|θ ∈ [x, y].
We will use a similar construction as in Section 5 to build a signal for which the
seller chooses to sell ex ante to all types θ ≥ x at a uniform price of a. In this case,
seller surplus uS is indeed given by SS, and buyer surplus is uB = AS − SS = BS.
Figure 3: The signal to induce (uB , uS) = (BS, SS)
Types below x and above y fully learn their valuation. Types in the interval
[x, y] again learn their pooling region that is assigned to their type, illustrated by
the corresponding shade of grey. The shaded areas are constructed in such a way,
that for any shade signal τ we have
E[θ|τ ] = a.
If we let the number of different shades go to infinity, we obtain a continuum of






θ − θ θ < x
∫ a
θ
f(s)(a− s)ds θ ∈ [x, y]
θ θ > y.
While types θ /∈ [x, y] learn their valuation, the signal τ(θ) for each θ ∈ [x, y] cor-
responds to exactly two types {θLτ , θ
H
τ }, which satisfy θ
L
τ ≤ a ≤ θ
H
τ , and E[θ|τ ] = a.
Figure 4: τ(θ) for the distribution in Figure 3 (stylized).
Now, consider an optimal menu of contracts, the seller will offer to the buyer.
Let θ̂ be the lowest type which buys given this menu. If θ̂ /∈ [x, y], then the buyer
learns θ̂ with certainty under τ , and the seller can charge at most a+p = θ̂ from this
type. Since this contract is available to all types, expected profits cannot exceed
(1− F (θ̂))θ̂ ≤ max
p
{(1− F (p))p} = πM ≤ SS.
The seller can do (weakly) better if she decides to sell ex ante to all types in [x, y].
Since for all these types we have E[θ|τ ] = a, a contract (a, p) = (a, 0) attracts
exactly all types θ ≥ x, and seller’s profit is (1− F (x))a = SS. One can show that
this contract is indeed optimal from the seller’s perspective.
The boundaries x and y define three partitions of types. In the optimal contract,
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types θ < x don’t trade and therefore induce an efficiency loss. Types θ ∈ [x, y]
trade, but make no surplus in expectation. Buyers θ > y receive an information rent
and extract the entire buyer surplus. Intuitively, by moving the boundaries x and
y one can realize any buyer and seller surplus that satisfies the natural constraints
in Theorem 2.
7 Conclusion
This paper emphasizes the role of private information in sequential screening. It
shows that there are almost no restrictions to the division of buyer and seller surplus,
that can arise in sequential screening for different ex-ante information.
The buyer-optimal signal keeps the buyer to some extent uninformed about his
valuation at the time of contracting. Thus, the ability of a monopolist to screen
buyers sequentially may not necessarily harm consumers, but lead to lower prices,
and increase efficiency.
It is worth noting that the European Union has taken a clear stand on the issue
of consumer rights in online markets. By Directive 2011/83/EU, any consumer is
granted the right to withdraw from online contracts within 14 days after delivery. As
Krähmer and Strausz (2015) point out, this policy effectively destroys the ability of
a monopolist to screen ex ante, granting the consumers the same information rent,
as under full information.14,15 This paper shows, that regulators, who care about
consumer utility, can improve on this regulation, if they have sufficent control over
information provided to individual buyers. The regulation of information may be
more flexible and powerful than the regulation of contracts, and therefore deserves
further study.
14Krähmer and Strausz (2015) already find that the welfare effect of such a policy is ambiguous,
and depends on consumers’ ex ante private information.
15The buyer can be forced to bear the shipping cost of returning the good, so there may be
scope for ex-ante screening to some very limited extent.
19
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. By the revelation principle for dynamic games (e.g., Myer-
son (1986)), we can restrict attention to direct, incentive compatible mechanisms:
The buyer reports his private information sequentially. After learning τ , he
reports its realization to the seller. If τ ∈ (0.5, 1] then τ = θ, thus a truthful report
of τ reveals θ already. If the buyer reports τ = 0 then the seller asks for a report of
θ ∈ [0, 0.5] after the buyer observes its realization.16
A direct mechanism specifies the trading rules as a function of the buyer’s re-
ports. Formally, the allocation rule
q : ({0} × [0, 0.5]) ∪ (0.5, 1] → [0, 1],
assigns to each complete report a probability of receiving the good. The transfer
rule
t : ({0} × [0, 0.5]) ∪ (0.5, 1] → R,
assigns to each complete report a monetary transfer from the agent to the principal.
Note that since τ defines a partition on θ, each feasible report corresponds
exactly to one claim of being some type θ ∈ [0, 1]. Identifying the report space with
the type space, let
u(θ̂|θ) = θq(θ̂)− t(θ̂)
be the utility of buyer of type θ reporting as if being type θ̂. Let us further simplify
notation by u(θ) := u(θ|θ). The incentive constraints, which guarantee truthful
reporting, read
16In Myerson (1986), the agent’s report space is the entire support of his private information
at each stage. That is, if the agent lies about the value of τ , he may still report θ truthfully and
inconsistent with the report of τ . Since in our case τ defines a partition on all types θ, however, the
seller can immediately detect and punish any untruthful report (τ, θ) with τ(θ) 6= θ, such that the
buyer would never choose such a report. It is therefore without loss of generality to consider only
direct mechanisms, which restrict the reports of θ to values that are admissible for the reported τ .
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∀θ ∈ (0.5, 1], θ̂ ∈ [0, 1] u(θ) ≥ u(θ̂|θ) (IC τ 6= 0)
∀θ̂ ∈ [0.5, 1] ❊[u(θ)|τ = 0] ≥ ❊[u(θ̂|θ)|τ = 0] (IC τ = 0)
∀θ ∈ [0, 0.5], θ̂ ∈ [0, 0.5] u(θ) ≥ u(θ̂|θ). (IC θ)
First period individual rationality reads
∀θ ∈ [0.5, 1] u(θ) ≥ 0 (IR τ 6= 0)
❊[u(θ)|τ = 0] ≥ 0 (IR τ = 0)







s.t. (IC τ 6= 0),(IC τ = 0),(IC θ),(IR τ 6= 0),(IR τ = 0).
We will derive the optimum for a so called “relaxed” problem P ′ with less
constraints, and verify ex post that the remaining constraints are satisfied for the
derived solution. The constraint (IC τ 6= 0) directly implies the weaker condition
∀θ ∈ (0.5, 1], θ̂ ∈ [0.5, 1] u(θ) ≥ u(θ̂|θ). (IC’ τ 6= 0)
We now define





s.t. (IC’ τ 6= 0),(IC θ),(IR τ = 0).
The solution to program P ′ must implement weakly higher seller surplus than
program P, as it faces less constraints.
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By Revenue Equivalence (e.g., Myerson (1981)), (IC θ) is equivalent to
1. q(θ) is increasing on [0, 0.5], and
2. u(θ) = u(0) +
∫ θ
0
q(s)ds for all θ ∈ [0, 0.5].





Further, in any optimal solution, (IR τ = 0) must bind, because otherwise the seller




































Again by Revenue Equivalence, (IC’ τ 6= 0) implies that on any closed interval
[θ̃, 1] ⊂ (0.5, 1], the allocation q(θ) is weakly increasing, and further for any θ ∈ [θ̃, 1]




Therefore, u(θ) is continuous on (0.5, 1], and, because q(θ) is weakly positive and
bounded, limθց0.5 u(θ) exists. Since by (IC’ τ 6= 0) for all θ ∈ (0.5, 1]





Moreover, if we had limθց0.5 u(θ) = u(0.5) + ε, for some ε > 0, the seller could in-
crease all transfers of types θ ∈ (0.5, 1] uniformly by ε and still satisfy all constraints
22
of P ′. A mechanism with limθց0.5 u(θ) > u(0.5) can therefore not be optimal. It
follows that any solution to P ′ must satisfy




for all θ ∈ [0.5, 1].
















































































Note that the seller’s utility is independent of the allocation for types θ ≤ 0.5.
Indeed, any attempt to increase surplus from these types equally increases the
information rent the seller has to provide to types θ ∈ [0.5, 1].
Since (2θ−1) > 0 for θ > 0.5, the seller maximizes her utility by setting q(θ) = 1
for any θ > 0.5. The seller’s maximal utility under P ′ therefore is
∫ 1
0.5
(2θ − 1)dθ = [θ2 − θ]10.5 = 0.25.






which corresponds exactly to the offer to sell the product ex ante at a uniform price
of 0.25. Since all buyer types obtain the same offer in this contract, it satisfies
all incentive constraints of P. Moreover, the contract yields positive profit for all
θ ≥ 0, therefore it satisfies the constraint (IR τ 6= 0) of program P as well.
Proof of Theorem 2. Take some arbitrary SS ≥ πM and BS ≥ 0, with
BS + SS ≤ E[θ]. We need to construct a signal such that the seller’s optimal mech-
anism induces seller utility uS = SS and buyer utility uB = BS.
Constructing the signal
Define x implicitly by
BS + SS =
∫ θ
x
θdF (θ) = (1− F (x))E[θ|θ ∈ [x, θ]]. (3)




θdF (θ) = E[θ], and
∫ θ
θ
θdF (θ) = 0. Since
0 < BS + SS ≤ E[θ],
there is exactly one x ∈ [θ, θ], for which (3) is satisfied.17
Define now y implicitly by
SS = (1− F (x))E[θ|θ ∈ [x, y]]. (4)
The right hand side is strictly increasing in y and since
(1−F (x))E[θ|θ ∈ [x, x]] = (1−F (x))x ≤ πM ≤ SS ≤ BS+SS = (1−F (x))E[θ|θ ∈ [x, θ]],
there is exactly one y ∈ [x, θ], which satisfies (4). Further, we call
a := E[θ|θ ∈ [x, y]].
17The assumption that F is continuous and increasing is innocuous and only for mathematical
convenience. If F has atoms, then τ(θ) is not deterministic. If F is not increasing, we loose
uniqueness of x and y. None of the results or intuitions hinge on these assumptions.
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θ − θ θ < x
∫ a
θ
f(s)(a− s)ds θ ∈ [x, y]
θ θ > y.
The signal prescribes full learning for θ < x and θ > y. For θ ∈ [x, y] the function




























Thus, for any τ with 0 < τ ≤ τ(x) there are exactly two types θLτ , θ
H
τ with τ =
τ(θLτ ) = τ(θ
H
τ ), where without loss of generality θ
L
τ < a < θ
H
τ . Let us call θ
L(τ) the
inverse function of τ(θ) on [x, a], and θH(τ) the inverse function of τ(θ) on [a, y].
This means that the distribution of τ is given by
G(τ) = F (θH(τ))− F (θL(τ)).
It follows18 that for any τ ∈ (0, τ(x)]
18We denote by P(A|τ) the regular conditional probability for A given τ . This notion extends
the concept of conditional probabilities to the case where one conditions on events of probability
zero. The regular conditional probability is defined by the condition that for any measurable sets
A,B the equality P(θ ∈ A, τ ∈ B) =
∫
B
P(A|τ)dG(τ) holds. It is unique almost surely. Since we
are interested in expectations only, this restriction is innocuous. For formal details see for example
§7 on regular conditional distributions in Shiryaev (1996).
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P(θHτ |τ) = P(θ > a|τ)
= lim
ε→0
P(θ > a|τ(θ) ∈ [τ, τ + ε])
= lim
ε→0
F (θH(τ + ε))− F (θH(τ))












































θHτ = a. (5)
This means that for any τ1, τ2 ∈ [0, τ(x)] with τ1 < τ2, the distribution F (·|τ2)
is a mean-preserving spread of F (·|τ1).
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The menu
We turn to the seller’s decision problem to choose an optimal menu of option con-
tracts, given τ . Consider the menu M = {(a, 0)}. All buyers with θ < x receive a
fully informative signal τ < 0, and know with certainty that their valuation satisfies
θ < a, so they would reject the contract. Types 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ(x) satisfy E[θ|τ ] = a,
and types τ > τ(x) satisfy E[θ|τ ] = τ > a, so they would both accept the contract
(a, 0), which sells ex ante at a uniform price of a. This means that under contract
M we have
uS = a(1− F (x)) = SS,
19Note however, that the common assumption in Courty and Li (2000) of
”
non-shifting sup-







θdF (θ)− uS = (BS + SS)− SS = BS.
This shows that the menu M indeed implements the buyer and seller utility we
want to construct. It remains to show, that M is an optimal menu for the seller for
the given signal τ .
The optimality of the menu
Let M̃ = {(ai, pi)}i∈I be an arbitrary menu of option contracts. We need to show
that it does not generate higher seller utility than SS.
Let θ̂ be the lowest type who purchases the good under M̃, in the sense that he
chooses some (a, p) ∈ M̃ to pay the upfront fee a, and decides to buy the good at
the price p, after he learns his type.
Case 1: θ̂ < x or θ̂ > y
In this case θ̂ learns his type with certainty under τ . Since, by assumption, he
accepts the contract (a, p), we can conclude that
a+ p ≤ θ̂.
Further, any buyer’s signal τ(θ) reveals to the buyer with certainty whether his
type satisfies θ > θ̂. This means, that any buyer with θ > θ̂ learns from his signal
realization that he receives positive utility from contract (a, p). Consequently no
type θ > θ̂ will accept a contract at higher total cost than a + p. Since θ̂ is by
assumption the lowest type that buys, we can conclude that
uS ≤ (a+ p)(1− F (θ̂)) ≤ θ̂(1− F (θ̂) ≤ max
p
{(1− F (p))p} = πM ≤ SS.
Case 2: θ̂ ∈ [x, a]





Thus, since type θL
τ(θ̂)
purchases the good under (a, p), so will type θH
τ(θ̂)
. By buyer’s
ex ante individual rationality we have
a+ p ≤ E[θ|τ(θ̂)] = a.
The contract (a, p) is therefore in particular also profitable to all types θ > y, who
27
learn their valuation ex ante with certainty. Hence, any of these types will as well
pay at most a + p ≤ a. Thus, even if the seller extracts all surplus from types








θdF (θ) + (1− F (y))a
= (F (y)− F (x))a+ (1− F (y))a
= (1− F (x))a
= SS
Case 3: θ̂ ∈ [a, y]





≥ p > θL
τ(θ̂)
, because otherwise θL
τ(θ̂)
would purchase the good for p
whenever θH
τ(θ̂)
does, violating that θH
τ(θ̂)
is the lowest type who purchases the good.
Lemma 1 shows that since the ex-ante participation constraint is satisfied for τ(θ̂),
it can’t bind for any higher τ ∈ [τ(θ̂), τ(y)].
Lemma 1. If for signal types 0 ≤ τ1 < τ2 ≤ τ(y) and some contract (a, p) with









− p) > 0. (IR τ2)
proof of Lemma 1. Call α1 := P(θ
H
τ1












If α2 > α1 this is immediate, since θ
H
τ2
> θHτ1 . Assume therefore in the following
that α2 ≤ α1.
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Now, since θLτ2 < θ
L
τ1




− p) = α1(θ
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Further, any type θ > y, who learns his type with certainty under τ , obtains a
utility of
uB = −a+ (θ − p) > −a+ (θ̂ − p) > −a+ P(θ̂|τ(θ̂))(θ̂ − p) ≥ 0
from contract (a, p). The contract thus generates positive expected utility to all
τ > τ(θ̂), and positive utility to all types θ > θ̂. This means that the contract
(a, p) alone induces all types θ ≥ θ̂ to purchase the good. Since, by assumption, θ̂
is the lowest type who purchases the good for menu M̃, any additional contract in
the menu does not increase trade efficiency. It could therefore only decrease seller
utility, since a buyer would only take it if it yielded higher rents to him than the
contract (a, p), and thus lower rents to the seller. Therefore, if M̃ is an optimal
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menu, we can assume M̃ = {(a, p)}, and seller utility is given by
uS =(1−G(τ(θ̂)))a+ (1− F (θ̂))p = (1− F (θ̂) + F (θ
L
τ(θ̂)
)− F (x))a+ (1− F (θ̂))p.
Since by ex ante IR we have a ≤ P(θ̂|τ(θ̂))(θ̂ − p), it follows that
uS ≤
(




P(θ̂|τ(θ̂))(θ̂ − p) + (1− F (θ̂))p.
Recall that 0 ≤ θL
τ(θ̂)
< p ≤ θ̂, since θ̂ is the lowest type who buys. If
(













≤ (1− F (x))P(θ̂|τ(θ̂))θ̂


























P(θ̂|τ(θ̂))(θ̂ − p) + (1− F (θ̂))p
= (1− F (θ̂))(θ̂ − p) + (1− F (θ̂))p






This concludes the proof that there is no menu M̃ which yields the seller a surplus
above SS. Consequently M is a seller-optimal contract.
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